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STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 52 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 10 
i n 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the State of 
Utah is appropriate pursuant to Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and order entered in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, judge presiding, following a trial 
without a jury on September 9, 1988. The court determined that 
a lease agreement between the respective parties herein, for 
outdoor advertising purposes, was no longer in effect and that 
the defendant/appellant, Reagan Outdoor Advertising (hereinafter 
"Reagan"), was therefore trespassing on the 
plaintiffs'/appellees', John W. and Helene B. Jarman (hereinafter 
"Jarmans"), property. 
In addition, this appeal is taken from the trial court's 
denial of Reagan's motion to amend the trial court's Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law entered after the trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to amend its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law to more accurately reflect the 
evidence presented during the trial? 
2. Did the trial court err in finding that the outdoor 
advertising lease agreement, previously executed between the 
1 
parties, was ambiguous with regard to the extent of Reagan's 
leasehold? 
3. If the trial court did not err in finding the extent of 
Reaganfs leasehold ambiguous, did it nevertheless err in finding 
that Reagan1s leasehold only extended to that portion of Jarmans' 
property upon which the outdoor advertising structures stood at 
the time the most recent lease agreement was executed? 
4. Did the trial court err in finding that the defendant was 
in trespass of Jarmans1 property and in ordering the removal of 
Reagan's outdoor advertising structures? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1971, Mr. Richard Paxman, representing Galaxy Outdoor 
Advertising, Reagan's predecessor in interest (R. 47), contacted 
the owners of the Hi-Ute Ranch in Summit County, Jarmans' 
predecessors in interest (R. 76) , to negotiate a lease of the Hi-
Ute property in order to emplace two outdoor advertising 
structures (R. 41) . Ultimately, an agreement was reached and two 
separate lease documents (the "1971 leases") were executed (R. 
44 and 45). 
Subsequently, two outdoor advertising structures were built 
on locations adjacent to State Highway 224 picked out by Mr. 
2 
Paxman (R. 42). These same structures were on location at the 
time the Jarmans purchased the property, which contains some 130 
acres (sometime in 1980); and, they were aware of their 
existence, having seen the signs before they purchased the 
property. Mr. Jarman eventually contacted Galaxy Outdoor to 
advise them of the change in ownership (R. 209-10, 11). 
In 1981, Mr. Terry K. Reid, representing Reagan, entered into 
discussions with Mr. Jarman to renew the lease agreement for the 
structures (R. 47). In 1982, the leasehold was renewed with the 
execution of a lease document (the "1982 lease") (R. 86) to 
replace the two previous documents. The 1982 lease agreement 
has become the subject of the instant action. 
The description of the property being leased from the 
Jarmans, pursuant to the 1982 lease, incorporated those 
descriptions found on the 1971 leases (R. 48). No address for, 
or better description of, the premises existed at the time the 
1971 leases were prepared so a general description of the 
proposed locations where the structures would be emplaced was 
used (R. 42). Such a method was a common means of identifying 
properties without addresses at that time (R. 209-37) . There is 
no address for the property even now; it is generally referred 
to as Kimball Junction (R. 74) . Likewise, there was no specific, 
or exact, description of the location of the structures, only a 
general description, approximately identified by using monuments 
(R. 209-14, 15, 25, 28, 37) . 
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It was the Jarmansf intention to allow Reagan to have two 
outdoor advertising sign locations next to State Highway 224 (R. 
209-29). 
Reagan continued to use the leasehold premises and to pay 
the agreed rental to the Jarmans for the locations from the 
execution of the 1982 lease to that point in time where the 
Jarmans refused to accept payment and initiated the instant 
action (R. 48). 
In 1987, the State of Utah began the widening of State 
Highway 224 in the vicinity of Kimball Junction after acquiring 
from the Jarmans a right-of-way of approximately 10 to 30 feet 
(R. 209-16). (The precise amount was never revealed during the 
trial.) The newly acquired State right-of-way took a portion of 
the Jarman property upon which the outdoor advertising structures 
were located (R. 209-41, 42). However, neither structure was 
completely located within the new right-of-way (R. 209-17, 41). 
The State, through Mr. Dear Holbrook, made a request to 
Reagan to have the structures moved off the right-of-way (R. 209-
39) . Reagan did move the signs; moving them just far enough away 
form the highway so that they would no longer be in the State's 
right-of-way and to be completely located on the property of the 
Jarmans1 (R. 49). 
The original description of the location of the structures 
as found in the 1971 and 1982 leases still describes their 
location (R. 42, 49). Mr. Jarman admitted during the trial that 
this is indeed the situation (R. 209-26, 27). 
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Reagan was paid by the State to relocate, not remove the 
structures (R. 209-67f 68). 
The Jarmans took the position that the 1982 lease only 
allowed Reagan to maintain the two outdoor advertising structures 
in the exact locations that these structures occupied when the 
lease was then renewed. They contended that moving the 
structures, even the few feet that they were, in fact, moved, 
constituted a trespass. In their Complaint, filed December 10, 
1987, they sought removal of the structures and monetary damages. 
The claim for money damages was withdrawn at the time of trial 
(R. 209-3) . 
Prior to trial Reagan made a motion for the entry of a 
Summary Judgment in its favor. This motion was denied. Trial 
was thereafter held in Summit County, the Honorable Judge Michael 
R. Murphy presiding, on September 9, 1988. The Court entered a 
judgment in favor of the Jarmans, ordering the structures removed 
and awarding the Jarmans their costs. 
The Court also made and entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in which it determined that the 1982 lease was 
ambiguous and Reagan was in trespass. Reagan made a motion to 
amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law; specifically 
directing the motion to specific Findings and Conclusions (R. 
Ill), and identifying the discrepancies that needed correcting. 
This motion was summarily denied. Reagan thereafter appealed to 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The 1982 outdoor advertising lease agreement is a renewal 
of the original 1971 lease agreements executed by the respective 
predecessors in interest of the current parties. The extent of 
Reagan's leasehold interest is clearly defined within the four 
corners of the instrument. In this respect the lease is not 
ambiguous. Reagan was entitled to move its structures, within, 
at least, the same general area that they were originally 
emplaced, to accommodate the widening of State Highway 224, 
without suffering a loss of said leasehold. The trial court 
erred in determining the lease ambiguous in this regard and in 
ordering the removal of the structures. 
The evidence presented during the trial clearly established 
the intent, and understanding, of the parties with regard to the 
extent of the leasehold. This evidence flies in the face of the 
trial court's ruling. In this respect the trial court committed 
clear error. Reagan is not in trespass of Jarmans' property and 
is entitled to remain thereon. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law, 
are not fully reflective of the evidence presented, nor are they 
completely accurate. It was error for the trial court to not 
amend the Findings and Conclusions, as requested by Reagan, to 
render them more accurate and complete. Corrected Findings and 
Conclusions will not be supportive of the trial court's judgment. 
The true reason for the court's ruling was revealed by the 
Court after the trial. The basis for its decision, it seems, was 
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for reasons other than the evidence presentedf and the issues 
before it. In this respect, as well, the trial court committed 
clear error in reaching a decision favorable to the Jarmans. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Amend the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law Should Have Been Granted 
Following the trial and the entry of the trial court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Reagan filed its motion 
to amend. The Findings (and Conclusions) being challenged were 
specifically set forth along with the basis therefore (R. Ill) . 
Reagan made reference to the evidence presented during the trial 
in support of each point. Despite this, and a clear basis 
existing to justify making the proposed amendments the trial 
court denied the motion in its entirety (R. 131) . The Court 
explained, in making the ruling, that "I didn't see anything 
different . . ." (R. 209-103, 105). 
Findings nos. 2 and 3 state that the 1982 lease agreement was 
for "specific locations" or "specific sites" (R. 104) . And, this 
is what the trial court stated following the trial (R. 209-98) . 
But this is not in harmony with the facts in evidence. 1) Mr. 
Paxman testified that a property address would have been used to 
describing the leasehold, rather than a landmark (or monument), 
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had the property had an address (R. 209-37). 2) The leasehold 
description as set forth in the 1982 lease is a general 
description: "State Hwy 224 across from state Hwy sheds s/o 
Kimball Jet & State Hwy 224 300' s/o State Hwy shed, s/o Kimball 
Jet" (R. 86) . 3) The leasehold interest allowed Reagan to 
utilize a "remaining portion" of the property should it be 
necessary to move the structures to accommodate property building 
and development (R. 86). 4) The possibility of relocating the 
structures was discussed by the parties during the negotiations 
that resulted in the 1982 lease renewal (R. 209-58, 59). These 
Findings are key points in resolving the case. In light of the 
evidence presented amending these Findings to provide that the 
leasehold allowed Reagan to maintain its structures in the 
general vicinity of the landmarks or "monuments" described is 
appropriate. 
It was (and is) the Jarmans' position that the Reagan 
leasehold only extended to their property upon which the 
structures were exactly located when the 1982 lease was executed. 
This is reflected in Finding no. 4. Yet, Mr. Jarman did not 
know, even at the time of trial, just where the signs were 
originally located (R. 209-14, 15, 28), how much of his property 
the State of Utah acquired (R. 209-16, 17), and where the signs 
were moved to (R. 209-17,); except that they were still within 
the leasehold description. 
Finding no. 4 goes on to state that it was the parties1 
intention to continue the leasehold for the existing locations 
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only. But testimony given during the trial clearly shows that 
the parties had discussions concerning the possible relocation 
of the signs (R. 209-54) and, Mr. Jarman stated that he never 
told Reagan that he wanted the lease to apply only to the 
specific piece of property that the structures then occupied (R. 
209-25) . In fact, Mr. Jarman testified that it was his intention 
to allow Reagan to have two signs next to the State highway (R. 
209-29) ! It is clear error for the trial court not to amend 
Finding no. 4 to state that even if it was Mr. Jarman's intent 
to so limit the leasehold that this was never communicated to 
Reagan, that he did intend for Reagan to have two signs next to 
the highway, and that there were discussions regarding the 
possibility of relocating the structures. 
For the purpose of this Appeal Reagan asks that the Court 
look specifically at but two other points with regard to the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: Findings nos. 5 and 8. 
In its Finding no. 5 the trial court found that the lease was 
ambiguous; at lease insofar as it related to the property 
description (R. 209-97) . The appellant will discuss this point 
in detail in the argument below. 
Finding no. 8 states that Reagan moved the structures, or 
"billboards," from the locations they occupied to other locations 
on Jarmans' property. The implication from this is that the 
structures were moved to a completely different portion of the 
Jarman property; to an area that the Jarmans never contemplated 
would be used for outdoor advertising purposes. (Which is, of 
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course, what the Jarmans wanted the trial court to think.) From 
the evidence presented during the trial this is clearly not the 
case. Only a portion of the structures were moved; just enough 
to remove them from the State's new right-of-way. In fact, the 
structures are not only still within the property description 
that Jarman first observed them at when he purchased the 
property, but Mr. Jarman admitted at trial that this is the case 
(R. 209-26, 27). It was clear error for the trial court not to 
amend Finding no. 8 to state that the structures were only 
partially relocated. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact (and the Conclusions of 
Law they support) go against the clear weight of evidence 
presented during the trial of the instant case and are, 
therefore, clearly erroneous. In this regard they should be set 
aside. Rule 52 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See also 
Sampson v. Richins, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 55 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) and General Glass Corp. v. Mast Construction Co., 766 P.2d 
429, 98 UAR 53, 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). This Court should set 
them aside and remand the case for the entry of amended Findings 
that are supported by the evidence. 
The Conclusions of Law should be reviewed under the 
"correction of error" standard identified in the case of Bailey 
v. Call, 767 P.2d 138, 100 UAR 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and be 
corrected to conform to the evidence presented. 
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II 
The 1982 Lease Agreement is Not Ambiguous 
The extent of Reagan's outdoor advertising leasehold can 
be resolved from the four corners of the 1982 lease document 
without the need to resort to extrinsic evidence. The pertinent 
terms and provisions are contained therein allowing the Court to 
determine, as a matter of law, the rights and liabilities of 
respective parties. 
The 1982 lease agreement states, in pertinent part: 
. . . The lessor does hereby grant and convey 
to the lessee and its assigns and successors, the 
exclusive right to use the following described prop-
erty for the purpose of erecting and maintaining 
thereon outdoor advertising structures . . . as may 
be desired by lessee for a term of ten years . 
located in the county of Summit, State of Utah and 
more particularly described as follows: State Hwy 
224 across from state Hwy sheds s/o Kimball Jet. & 
State Hwy 224 300' s/o State Hwy shed, s/o Kimball 
Jet. . . 
. . . Lessor shall have the right to terminate 
this lease . . . if : (a) Lessor builds or develops 
on the property where the sign(s) structure(s) is 
situated; or (b) In the event Lessor sells the 
premises, the buyer of said premises has the right 
to terminate this lease . . . Lessee will remove its 
sign(s) . . . If any portion of the property is not 
utilized for such buildings, Lessee has the option 
to use the remaining portion on the same terms. . . 
(emphasis added). 
From the stated provisions it is clear that the Jarmans gave to 
Reagan the right to both erect and maintain outdoor advertising 
structures on their property in Summit County at two locations 
along State Highway 224 for a term of ten years. One location 
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was across from the State's highway sheds; the other was 300 feet 
south of the sheds. 
There is no other limitation embodied in the document with 
regard to the locations of the structures- There is no other 
reasonable interpretation that can be given the agreement- The 
lease agreement must be enforced in accordance with the 
intentions manifest by the language used by the parties. Ephraim 
Theatre Company v. Hawk, 321 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1958). To do 
otherwise would be to allow the courts to add some term, or 
terms, to the agreement that the parties could, had they wanted 
to, put in the agreement themselves. Both appellate courts in 
Utah have made it clear that they will not inject ambiguity into 
a contract where no exists in order to save a party from what, 
in retrospect, seems an ill-advised agreement. Crowther v. 
Carter, 767 P.2d 138, 99 UAR 29, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Dalton 
v. Jerico Const. Co. , 642 P.2d 748 (Utah 1982). Six years after 
entering into the lease agreement with Reagan the Jarmans may 
have changed their minds with regard to allowing the leasehold, 
but that does not excuse them from holding to the original 
agreement. 
The lease agreement further provides that the structures may 
be relocated on Jarmans' remaining property should the signs 
need be removed because of building and development, or in the 
event of sale. If, as the Jarmans claim, there was no right to 
relocate the structures anywhere because the leasehold was 
limited exclusively to the locations the structures occupied at 
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the time the 1982 lease was executed then this clause was 
unnecessary and should have been stricken. 
The language used in an agreement is ambiguous only if 
the words used to express the meaning and intention of the 
parties are insufficient in a sense that the contract may be 
understood to reach two or more plausible meanings. American 
Bonding Co. v. Nelson, 763 P.2d 814, 94 UAR 42, 43-44 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). There is no other plausible meaning! 
The interpretation of this lease agreement can be determined 
by the words of the agreement and is, therefore, not ambiguous. 
The intent of the parties can be culled from the terms found 
within the lease. 
The interpretation of this lease agreement is a question of 
law. Copper State Leasing v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture, 90 
Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24 (Sup. Ct. 1988). Because the lease 
agreement is not ambiguous this Court need not give the trial 
court's ruling any particular weight, but review it for 
correctness. Cecala v. Thorlev, 764 P.2d 643, 96 UAR 15, 16 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). See also, Heller v. U.S. Rock Wool Co., 
762 P.2d 1104, 93 UAR 8, 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) and Kimball v. 
Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). It is clear from the 
foregoing that the ruling of the trial court was not correct and 
needs be overturned. 
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Ill 
Even If The Trial Court Did Not Err In Ruling 
That The 1982 Outdoor Advertising Lease Was Ambiguous 
It Was Error To Find That The Leasehold Was Limited 
To The Exact Locations That The Signs Occupied At The 
Time This Lease Was Exected 
It is well settled that the standard of review of a trial 
court's ruling on a contract found to be ambiguous is that this 
Court must find that ruling "clearly erroneous." Bailey v. Call, 
supra., Crowther v. Carter, supra., Power Systems & Controls v. 
Keith's Electrical Constr. Co, 765 P.2d 5, 97 UAR 34 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). But, as discussed above, it is improper for a court 
to inject ambiguity in order to "save" a party. Crowther, 
supra. , at 99 UAR p. 31. 
Nevertheless, if the 1982 lease agreement is ambiguous the 
extrinsic evidence presented during the trial of the instant case 
was more than sufficient to establish that Reagan had the right 
to relocate its structures in the vicinity of their original 
locations without a loss of the leasehold and without being in 
trespass of the Jarman property. 
Much of the evidence supporting the above position, extracted 
from the record (mainly the record made during the trial) has 
already been stated above. These facts, in review, are: 1) The 
1982 lease agreement allows Reagan to relocate its signs; 2) no 
exact description for the location of the Reagan structures was 
affixed to the 1971 leases and no attempt fix their exact 
locations was made at the time the 1982 lease was executed; 3) 
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the description of the property being leased still matches the 
description of the structures' locations after the relocation; 
4) Mr. Jarman agrees that this is, in fact, the situation, that 
the structures are still located according to the property 
description; 5) it was the Jarmans1 intention to allow Reagan to 
have two signs next to State Highway 224; 6) Reagan was paid by 
the State to relocate, not remove, the structures; 7) no 
amendment to, or deletion of, the 1982 lease agreement was 
accomplished to otherwise limit Reagan's ability to relocate the 
structures or to evidence that the Jarmans did not intend that 
Reagan should be limited to only those exact locations that the 
structures then occupied; 8) the Jarmans still own the property 
the Reagan structures are located upon; 9) Reagan never 
understood that it was strictly limited with regard to the 
location of its signs; 10) only a portion of the sign structures 
were in the new State right-of-way and only a partial relocation 
of the structures was accomplished in any event. 
Only the mere statement by Mr. Jarman that he "intended" the 
lease to be limited to sign locations of 1982 stands in 
opposition to the above. This statement is not supported by any 
other evidence and is directly controverted by Reagan and the 
1982 lease document. If nothing else the Jarmans have failed to 
carry the burden of proof required of them in a case of this 
nature. 
The Appellant has met its burden and shown that the ruling 
of the trial court goes against the "clear weight of evidence," 
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and is "clearly erroneous." Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell, 104 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 26, 27 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The evidence presented 
during the trial is insufficient to support the finding made. 
General Glass Corp., supra., 98 UAR at p. 55. 
At the close of the trial proceedings the lower court 
indicated that it was concerned that by its terms the 1982 lease 
might automatically be continued to the year 2002 and seemed to 
have some concern that this would cause future contention between 
the respective parties if the court were to rule for Reagan. Now, 
the lower court did state that this was not a reason for its 
ruling, but that "[T]here will be peace now . . ." (R. 209-99.) 
This issue (of an extension to the initial lease term) was 
never before the court and not interjected into the trial 
proceedings. If this issue did not enter into the trial court's 
decision why was it even discussed? 
CONCLUSION 
For those reasons set forth above the defendant/appellant, 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, respectfully requests that this Court 
1) overturn the judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of 
Summit County holding that Reagan is trespassing on the property 
of the plaintiffs'/appellees ' ; 2) overturn the District Court's 
order that Reagan remove its two outdoor advertising structures 
from Jarmans' property at Kimball Junction; and 3) remand the 
16 
case to the lower court for the entry of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law consistent herewith. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / "~~ day of May, 1989. 
Douglas T. Hall 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served 4 copies of Appellant's Brief 
upon the Appellees by causing same to be delivered to the offices 
of Appellees1 attorneys of record, Ronald E. Nehring and Don R. 
Schow, at City Centre I, Suite 900, 175 East Fourth South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this / ^ day of May, 1989 
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Tab A 
^Sir^t rH-
Kjaluxw \Jutdoor ^^auertidina, *Jrnc; 
4180 SOUTH STATE STREET - PHONE 262-2531 
SAIT LAKE-CltreijfAH 84107 
In consideration of the sum ioilars 
per annum, pavau^ as ion. 
the undersigned lessor, having full right and authority in the premises, hereby 
leases to the Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., lessee, its successors op assigns,, ex- i 
dusively with the privilege of access to and upon the premises, known as A. 
*z 
?do X 
u;o * */~ f raJ< 
SS£ 
XL *r>c/ {*///<+/ 
KT*-** 
for the erection and maintenance of advertising signs from the st 
y. 
f/i day of 19. >Z-to the / <r day of Ul £kZ 
1Q 7 A^anH on like terms for the succeeding years, unless terminated as hereinafter 
mentioned-
't. It* i s expressly- agreed/ thafc- the lessor may order the advertising: signs* removed at any time during- the -
'lift-"of this contract by giving the lessee thirty days written notice that the property is sold or is to be 
imprr ed by the erection of buildings thereon, and in such case, the lessor shall refund, pro-rata, the 
unearned portion of prepaid rental, or by the lessee, by giving the lessor thirty days written notice. If,, 
in the opinion of tHe lessee, the said space becomes in any way obstructed, this lease may, at the option-
of the lessee* be terminated and lessor will refund the unearned portion of prepaid rental. All materials 
-placed upon this property under this lease shall remain the property of the lessee and may be removed 
by tbe lessee at any time. 
Accepted: 
Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 
*'/f?<&^3'£S/>4gr 
Address 
TabB 
i^axaxw \Jutdoor ~^duerti5inay Jfnc* 
4 1 8 0 SOUTH STATE STREET - PHONE 262-2531 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 0 7 
—, JO , X3-
In consideration of the sum of J ! — ^ _ 1 — £ r t / ' / , / . \ — s *'VKm-&$B£r& 
per annum, payable as follows: ^ 
the undesigned lessor, having full right and authority in the premises, hereby 
leases to the Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., lessee, its successors or assigns, ex-
clus:. ely with the privilege of access to and upon the premises kaown A*T &*/ r*tf&£'ltfj 
for the erection and maintenance of advertising signs from the L day of 
£ •' A 1Q / 7 / to t h e - ^ ^ tey of / - V < S 
13 ^ 7 ^ and on like terms for the succeeding years, unless terminated as hereinafter 
mentioned. 
It'is-'expressly "greed that the lessor-may order the advertising: signs removed at any time during the 
life of this contract by giving the lessee thirty days written notice that the property is sold or is to be 
improved by the erection of buildings thereon, and in such case, the lessor shall refund, pro-rata, the 
unearned portion of prepaid rental, or by the lessee, by giving the lessor thirty days written notice, If, 
in the opinion of the lessee, the said space becomes in any way obstructed, this lease may, at the option 
of the lessee, be terminated and lessor will refund the unearned portion of prepaid rental. All materials 
placed upon this property under this lease shall remain the property of the lessee and may be removed 
by the lessee at any time. 
Accepted: 
Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 
A„ant 
zfr^fs-fSyg" 
Address 
TabC 
m+eagan \Outdoor Advertising >~~. v^ ^ 
4180 South'State. Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 £ : . _ ^ " 
it Page l.:±f.-
*~-"^ - This agreement madeahd entered[ in ioV the undersigned lessor, (the "Lessor") and by Reagan Outdoor -$** 
i Advertising, (the "Lessee"). Both lessor andjessee acknowledge^the receipt and sufficiency of good and. .\ 
Z- valuable consideration and agree "as followsi~' * ~'-: TOv! x*?£,s V _*•*» — '--r^r - ~ ~ "***?;." ' " "^WF 
••"'^ *>j''hT£r^ -'''^ *r^ tMri>r IT- --,-:- ~' -*v;r'' "' --•~*"'v''-7 ^T^ini,** -y - - ••.-•-• ^  _-_j_ f^-_-~ .l/*'?^/- y :I?^*7"i^~^^^ 
f^ta?'-Thie lessor does hereby grantand convey to the lessee and its assigns and successors, the exclusive right to ^ ^ 
*• use the following describedjp^pe>tyjpr_the purpose of erecting and maintaining thereon outdoor advertising "3^ 
^structures including such>necesstttycTe<«?es, structures, connections, supports and appurtenances as may^ .be "*r 
~ desired by lessee for a term of tej^ear>^mmencing on or before "" 1 s t day of FftKruorv Vffi fffiat^:.: 
*- option of lessee, upon the^olJiSSr^aescribed land, together with ingress and egress to and upor&the same, "_ 
^located in the ^nnfynf^1 <?nmm^
 t>«..^ >.... .w~~»..»,—, State of Utah and more particularly described a s * ^ 
vw 
j^a^is, (Lessee may place on or attach to this instrument, subsequent to execution, a metes and bounds description of the location.) *-^ * 
'-—- Lessee shall pay lessor the amount of$ ^00,00 annually* payable (monthly, quarterly;'semi-, 
annually); however, prior.to construction and obtaining permits by lessee the rental shall be Five Dollars., 
:
-=^;This lease shall continue on the same terms and conditions for a like successive period; thereafter, this. 
lease shall continue in full force on the same terms and conditions for a like successive period or periods, unlesa 
^lessor delivers to lessee notice of termination within ninety days of the end of said term.^  - " 1 ~ ^ '-: ••'•; 
Z':~. It is further expressly a^r^etTtna^essee' mayterrmnate this lease by giving written notice and paying a 
penalty of one year's rent/at any ftme within thirty days prior to the end of any twelve month period' 
subsequent to the commencement date of this lease. Provided further, if the said space becomes obstructed so • 
as to lessen the advertising value of any of lessee's signs erected on said premises, or if traffic is diverted or 
reduced, or if the use of any such signs is prevented or restricted by law, or if for any reason a building permit'. 
^ for erection or modification is refused this lease may, at the option of lessee, be terminated or the rent reduced 
• to Five Dollars while said condition exists and in such event lessor shall refund prorata any prepaid "rental for 
.the unexpired term. Lessor agrees that no such obstruction insofar as the same is within lessor's control will be 
Tpermittd or allowed. Lessor authorizes lessee to trim and cut whatever trees, bushes, brush as it deems 
^necessary for unobstructed view of its advertising display. 
r- ~- All advertising sighs placed upon the described premises are to remain the property of lessee and may be 
removed by lessee at any time. If lessee is prevented by law, or government or military order, or other causes 
beyond lessee's control, from illuminating, its signs, the lessee may reduce the rental provided herein by 
" one-half with such reduced rental to remain in effect so long as such condition* continues to exist. Lessor shall 
have the right to terminate this lease at any time during the term of this lease if: (a)_Lessor builds or develops, 
on the property where the sign(s) structurefsT is situated; or (b) In the*event Lessor sells the'premises, "the 
buyer of said premises has the right to terminate this lease within thirty (30) days'immediately fojlowing 
^recordation of deed of sale, if buyer gives lessee Avritten'hotice of termination.' Lessee will remove'its sfgn(s). 
^within thirty (30) days after receiving a written copy of the deed or valid building permit together'with prepaid:" 
-unearned rerif. Ifany portion of the property is notntitteedfof such buildings. Lessee has the option to use the-
^remaining portion on the same terms.--v^*--^^-;.*,''i.«.*a 
;;:?. Lessor warrants the title of said leasehold for the term herein mentioned. In the event this lease is not 
'renewed or cancelled, lessor agrees that he will not for a period of five years subsequent to the date of 
^termination, release said premises to any other advertiser other than lessee for advertising purposes. Inithe jevent Lessor shall decide aurihg the term of this lease to sell the premises described herein. Lessor shall give 
"written notice to Reagan of the terms and price offered by a third party. Reagan shall be entitled for thirty (30) 
days to acquire thepremises on the terms and conditions in said notice. If Reagan does not exercise said right of 
purchase, the Lessor shall not sell the premises on other terms for six (6) months. Thereafter, Reagan shall. 
; nave the same right as to any subsequent offer to purchase. It is expressly understood that neither the lessor: 
'nor lessee is bound by any stipulations, representations, or agreements not printed or written in this lease. 
2^*f*-*^ ^ W 3 ^ # * ^ ^ 5 3 . ' - S H ; Z Z ^ ^ C X ^ Z ^ - ^ ^ Z ^ ^ » ^ ^ ~ ^ V ^ ^ - ^ - . " . ^ S ^ S 
i^^This agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding upon the heirs, personal representatives,. 
Successors, and assigns of the parties hereto, v ^ ^ f ^ ?yp^ • -^v* v •"' '•>-*•• ':z _-— ^ "^  *~^  
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This agreement made and entered into by the undersigned lessor, (the "Lessor") and by Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising, (tht "lessee"*. Both lessor and lessee acknowledge the receipt and sufficiency of good and 
valuable consideration and agree as follows: 
The lessor does hereby grant and convey to the lessee and its assigns and successors, the exclusive right to 
use the following described property for the purpose of erecting and maintaining thereon outdoor advertising 
structures including such necessary devices, structures, connections, supports and appurtenances as may be 
desired by lessee for a term often years commencing on or before day of 19 at 
option of lessee, upon the following described land, together with ingress and egress to and upon the same, 
located in the county of- : State of Utah and more particularly described as 
follows: 
(Lessee may place on or attach to thif instrument, subsequent to execution a metes and ovjna* description of" the lot^tK.-r. 
Lessee shall pay lessor the amount of $ annually, payable (monthly, quarterly, semi-
annually); however, prior to construction and obtaining permits by lessee the rental shall be Five Dollars. 
This lease shall continue on the same terms and conditions for a like successive period; thereafter, this 
lease shall continue in full force on the same terms and conditions for a like successive period or periods, unless 
lessor delivers to lessee notice of termination within ninety days of the end of said term. 
It is further expressly agreed that lessee may terminate this lease by giving written notice and paying a 
penalty of one year's rent at any time within thirty days prior to the end of any twelve month period 
subsequent to the commencement date of this lease. Provided further, if the said space becomes obstructed so 
as to lessen the advertising value of any of lessee's signs erected on said premises, or if traffic is diverted or 
reduced, or if the use of any such signs is prevented or restricted by law, or if for any reason a building permit 
for erection or modification is refused this lease may. at the option of lessee, be terminated or the rent reduced 
to Five Dollars while said condition exists and in such event lessor shall refund prorata any prepaid rental for 
the unexpired term. Lessor agrees that no such obstruction insofar as the same is within lessor's control will be 
permittd or allowed. Lessor authorizes lessee to trim and cut whatever trees, bushes, brush as it deems 
necessary for unobstructed view of its advertising display. 
AH advertising signs placed upor: the described premises are to remain the property of lessee and may be 
removed by lessee at any time. If lessee is prevented by law. or government or military order, or other causes 
beyond lessee's control, from illuminating its signs, the lessee may reduce the rental provided herein by 
one-half with such reduced rental to remain in effect so long as such condition continues to exist Lessor shall 
have the right to terminate this lease at any time during the term of this lease if: (a) Lessor builos or develops 
on the property where the sign(s» structure ? is situated: or *h» In the event Lessor sells the premises, the 
buyer of said premises has the righ; to terminate this lease within thirty «30» days immediately following 
recordation of deed of sale, if buyer gives lessee written notice of termination. Lessee will remove its sign's) 
within thirty (30* days after receiving a written copy of the deed or valid building permit together with prepaid 
unearned rent. If any portion of the property is not utilized for such buildings. Lessee has the option to use the 
remaining portion on the same terms. 
Lessor warrants the title of said leasehold for the term herein mentioned. In the event this lease is not 
renewed or cancelled, lessor agrees that he will not for a period of five years subsequent u> the date of 
termination, release said premise? to any other advertiser other than lessee for advertising purposes In the 
event Lessor shall decide during the term of this lease to sell the premises described herein. Lessor shah give 
written notice to Reagan of the terms and price offered by a third party. Reagan shall be entitled for thirty i 30) 
days to acquire the premises on the terms and conditions in said notice. If Reagan does not exercise said right of 
purchase, the Lessor shall not sell the premises on other terms for six <6i months. Thereafter, Reagan shall 
nave the same right as to any subsequent offer to purchase. It is expressly understood that neither the lessor 
nor lessee is bound by any stipulations, representations, or agreements not printed or written in this lease. 
This agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding upon the heirs, personal representatives, 
successors, and assigns of the parties hereto. 
Executed this day of ,19 
LESSEE: REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING 
TabE 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Jon C. Heaton (1444) 
Ronald E. Nehring (2374) 
Robert G. Wing (4445) 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AN£ FOI. 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH [[ \{ ))[F^ \( 
JOHN W. JARMAN and HELENE B, 
JARMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 9636 
(Judge Michael R. Murphy) 
The above-captioned matter came on for trial without a 
jury before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy sitting in 
Coalville, Utah on September 9, 1988. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Ronald E. Nehring. Defendant was represented by 
Stanley J. Preston. The Court received the testimony of 
witnesses and documentary evidence. Having considered the 
same, together with the arguments of counsel, the Court, 
pursuant to Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs and defendant entered into a Lease 
dated February 1, 1982. The Lease was drafted in its entirety 
by defendant. 
2. The Lease describes two specific locations on 
real property owned by the plaintiffs upon which defendant was 
authorized to locate two billboards. 
3. Prior to the execution of the Lease between 
plaintiffs and defendant, Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., an 
entity subsequently acquired by the defendant, entered into two 
leases with plaintiffs' predecessor in interest. Each of these 
leases authorized the placement of one billboard on a specific 
site — the site occupied by the billboards at the time the Lease 
between plaintiffs and defendant was signed. 
4. Based upon the property description in the 
February 1982 Lease, the fact that the billDoards were in place 
at the time the Lease was signed, and based upon the testimony 
of Mr. Jarman that he intended to lease defendant only the 
property upon which the billboards were situated, the Court 
finds that the parties intended the Lease to continue the right 
of the defendant to maintain the billboards in their existing 
locations. 
5. The Court finds that the Lease of February 1, 
1982 is ambiguous and thus subject to the introduction and 
consideration of parol evidence to aid in its interpretation. 
6. The Court finds that plaintiffs did not intend to 
grant defendant a leasehold interest in the entire parcel of 
property owned by him in Snyderville, Utah, 
7. In late 1987, the Utah Department of 
Transportation took possession of the land upon which the 
billboards were situated. 
8. Defendant removed the billboards from the 
locations they occupied upon the execution of the 1982 Lease 
then moved them to other locations on plaintiffs1 property 
without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Lease executed by plaintiffs and defendant 
dated February 1, 1982 is ambiguous as a whole. For example, 
under the interpretation of the Lease urged by defendant, the 
Lease could never be terminated so long as there remained 
sufficient undeveloped land upon which to position two 
billboards. The Lease, which was drafted by the defendant and 
against whom ambiguous terms must be construed, appears to have 
been prepared for the purpose of leasing property upon which 
signs had not yet been erected. 
2. Under the terms of the Lease and consistent with 
the intention of the parties, defendant was authorized to 
maintain its billboards only on two specific locations and was 
not authorized to move one or both to any other site on 
plaintiffs' property. 
3. Defendant's relocation of its billboards on 
plaintiffs' property other than that described in the Lease 
constitutes a trespass. 
4. Defendant is ordered to remove the billboards now 
located on plaintiffs' property no later than 45 days from the 
date of the Judgment herein. 
(, 
DATED this / ) ^day of October, 1988 
BY THE COURT: 
Michael R. Murphy 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
Attorney for Defendants 
TabF 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN W. JARMAN and HELEN B. MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS 
JARMAN, OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING Civil No. 963 6 
COMPANY, 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
defendant moves this Court to amend its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law entered on October 18, 1988, on the grounds 
that there is insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support 
said Findings and Conclusions. 
This Motion is based on the points stated below, the files 
and records of this action, and the evidence introduced during 
trial. Specifically, defendant objects to and requests that 
the Court amend the following Findings and Conclusions. 
Findings SISI 2 and 3. In these paragraphs, the Court finds 
that the February 1, 1982 Lease between the parties describes 
"two specific locations" on the real property, and that the 
preceding leases authorized the placement of one billboard 
each "on a specific site." These Findings are contrary to 
the evidence at trial as follows: 
(a) The Lease by its terms describes approximate 
locations for two signs along State Highway 224. 
(b) Terry Reed testified at trial that during the 
negotiation of the February 1, 1982 Lease, Mr. Jarman expressed 
concern over whether the Lease would continue in the event of 
development or sale of the property. Accordingly, these two 
concerns were addressed in the Lease, which by its terms, 
provides for relocation of the signs. Specifically, the Lease 
gives defendant the option to use the remaining portions of 
property which are not developed. 
(c) While Mr. Reed testified that relocation was 
discussed during the negotiations for the Lease, Mr. Jarmanfs 
testimony was only that he could not recall whether it was 
discussed or not. 
Based on the foregoing, defendant asserts that the Lease 
was not limited "to specific locations." 
Finding f 4. Here the Court states that "based upon the 
testimony of Mr. Jarman that he intended to lease defendant 
only the property upon which the billboards were situated, 
the Court finds that the parties intended the Lease to continue 
the right of the defendant to maintain the billboards in their 
existing locations. These findings are incomplete based upon 
the evidence at trial and should be amended to further state 
that Mr. Jarman's intent was never communicated to defendant. 
Moreover, for the reasons set forth above, defendant asserts 
that the weight of the evidence supports its position that it 
could maintain the billboards in their existing locations or 
relocate them to other locations along the highway in the 
event of development or sale. 
Finding $ 5. Defendant objects to the Court's finding 
that the Lease is ambiguous. For the reasons set forth above, 
it is defendant's position that the Lease specifically provides 
for relocation and is not ambiguous as to the manner in which 
the Lease can be terminated. 
Finding $ 6. Here the Court finds "that plaintiffs did 
not intend to grant defendant a leasehold interest in the entire 
parcel of property owned by him in Snyderville, Utah." This 
finding implies that it was defendant's position that it did 
have a leasehold interest in the entire parcel of property. 
Defendant did not urge such an interpretation of the Lease. 
It is defendant's position that the Lease granted defendant 
the right to maintain two signs along the road, which signs 
could be relocated to other locations alongside the road if 
the property on which the signs are currently located were 
sold or developed. The signs only have value if they are 
located next to the road where they can be seen by passing 
m o t o r i s t - , Defendant d i d r o t a s s e r t t h a t : - :!ouZ 1 r e l o c a t e 
t > ' vdS 
liKr an easement wii.jri granted them Li — L lq.-i ^ ,.^ >-ui'. two 
signs along the road on undeveloped property owned by Mr. 
Jarmai 1. 
Finding <H 7. H-re the Court finds that in 1987, UDOT 
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Conclusion fl 1 , Again, defendant disputes the Ccur'1-
als^ disacre^D Vv_ • . ,. ^  *.. ,-..i >. c„. .... . ...- ;v.:er.i;.. -
-4-
b e t e r m i n a t e d sc LZI\ : a s L i . n t i r e m a ^ n e - ; a^i. ^ ^ a i u n a c . t i j u . : 
l a n d upon wh ich t o p o s i t i o n two b i l l b o a r d s , " T h i s i s an 
e x a g g e r a t i o n and OVK> L t:> Ld LejiitMi I o f du fo i i dan I ' ,s | H I M 1 W H HI I 
t r i a l . As n o t e d a b o v e , d e f e n d a n t a s s e r t s t h a t t h e L e a s e was 
n i 3 a i: I : • : > an e a s emen t wh i ch g r a n t e d i t t h e r i g h t t o 1 o c a t e 
t w o fai ] 1 b o a r d s a l o i l g s i d e t i le i: o a d . Tl i e r e i ; e .s i ic :i  i: I t: = : 
by e i t h e r p a r t y d t i r i ng t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s t o l i m i t t h e n i l b o a . a s 
t .e e x a c t ai id s p e c i f i c ] o c a t i o n s u p o n w h i c h t h e y wc - "' ^ ' - t e d , 
a n d s u c h -i l i i c e r p n . u i i u j . . s c o n t r a r y •_ t e i m s - - * ;e 
w h i c ^ p r o v i d p s f ^ r ! ^ l o c a t i o n . 
-j^fc.(-> I C d i i t h a t 
Mr. Jarmar. s p e c i f i c ^ : , stated ii.a . _ %...: . ,. .^erstanding 
that the Lease ecu1-'! - - w . . r p ^ i n a t P 1 i ~ ^h- e n t u e parcel 
of property upon wh. * I«I,. 
The evidence at trie-.:, established tnar tie entire yai ^ - o£ 
uie bxj.lboards v«>-- "incited was not. sold 
t tno S t . .- w. .-1 . us, evpn - . •. : L\erpreta t ion 
the Lease could no* .,e terminated because UDOT had not taken 
p o - — •' . - . ,- ...^^ ^r -,.. : ,,„. „ vhich the bi] Iboards 
wert situatcu . x... ^ w.. s*:.^ .^  , del wi: ^;._. L I •: - 3 tha !:  I .1 n = Coi u: t 
needs " " . iclude ii^iinqs rj;.d ccnclusi ;ns t::a: Mr ,. Jarman did 
r
 r
 ;;iu declare n 
trespass because :_ 11*= entire parcel - . ^ i^perty was not sold 
to the State. 
Conclusion 5 2 «"> T 7 , 4-V« reasons set : U A,.- '^.r V ' f .-.J.int 
q - p | p . c -*- h ,i +- *~ • . - ' r> 1 ^  >" T 
l o c a t i o n s and was nor a u t h o r i z e d \ -nove ont 
b e c a u s e L^„ ^ u ^ s e con ten i r . o i i e . . . _ -.-_. 
b e c a u s e t h e r e was e v i d e n c e t h a t t h i s w l;:;-;:.ss^ 
,. an-/ 
*-he -viauce 
•w^e: 'Tie 
^ C . 'v_J. ., 
enti r^ pa rrpl r ^  r r r oerty wa s so1d . 
ConL...o. x „, 
' S ^ O l A ' l U S l O h t h a t i c j ' . a l i . asserts th:.t ~hc- C > 
-•
%f endant 
d^ix^/ies 
^v i iP^ irp Ht rrial . 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
0 
J± 
STANLEY/J. PRESTON 
Attorn^/B for Defendant 
AFFIDA VTT OF SERVICE 
STATrl OF ''TAH 
for 
BROWN 
endant 
ing duly sworn, says m a t she a..- C .. ^ yei 
c
— w , Christensen & Martineau, attorneys 
; that she served the attached 
en to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
• s e No, 9636 
./ Summit County - UJL u / 
u^ wii the parties listed below by placing a true and correct 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed *-~: 
•.Attorneys LUJ. I'lain Lifts: 
Jon C. Heaton 
Ronald E. Nrhring 
Robert G. Wing 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lak- i^f-v. u+?> R/.n ' 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the 2 8th day f October , 1988, 
\(U ii^fy^L . f 
I;, si oi I Exp,] res : 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this _?8th day of 
October , 3 9 8?. 
\0M _ _ 
NOTAF& PU^ljIC "" / 
R e s i d i n g in thr- Sr * S ' 
